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Abstract
Whether currency can be efficiently provided by private competitive money suppliers is
arguably one of the fundamental questions in monetary theory. It is also one with practical
relevance because of the emergence of multiple competing financial assets as well as competing
cryptocurrencies as means of payments in certain class of transactions. In this paper, a dual
currency version of Lagos and Wright (2005) money search model is used to explore the answer
to this question. The centralized market sub-period is modeled as infinitely repeated game
between two long lived players (money suppliers) and a short lived player (a continuum of
agents), where longetivity of the players refers to the ability to influence aggregate outcomes.
There are multiple equilibria, however we show that equilibrium featuring lowest inflation
tax is weakly renegotiation proof, suggesting that better inflation outcome is possible in an
environment with currency competition.
JEL Codes: E52, E61.
Keywords: currency competition, repeated games, long lived- short lived players, inflation
tax, money search, weakly renegotiation proof.
∗The paper is based on my PhD dissertation completed at the University of Connecticut (UConn). I thank Christian
Zimmermann (Major Advisor, St.Louis Fed), Ricardo Lagos (Associate Advisor, NYU) and Vicki Knoblauch (Associate
Advisor, UConn) for their guidance and support. I thank participants at various conferences and the anonymous refer-
ees at Economic Inquiry for their helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are mine. Email:parag.econ@gmail.com.
1
1 Introduction
Whether currency can be efficiently provided by competitive money suppliers is arguably one
of the fundamental questions in monetary theory. It is also one with practical relevance because
of the emergence of multiple competing financial assets as well as competing cryptocurrencies
like Bitcoin and Ethereum among others as means of payments in certain class of transactions.
Starting with Hayek in 1976, several authors have explored this question. In general, the answer
is a straightforward yes if the money suppliers could operate under full commitment, but quite
circumspect under lack of commitment and the associated time inconsistency.
In this paper, I explore this question in a money search model with two competing fiat monies
and no commitment. The two money suppliers are modeled as utility-maximizing strategic play-
ers in a money search model that is a variant of Lagos & Wright (2005)(LW henceforth). The cen-
tralized market sub-period interaction between the money suppliers and the anonymous agents
is modeled as an infinitely repeated game as in Waknis (2014). Under reputation, the equilibrium
is characterized using the theory of repeated games for more than one long-lived player and a
short-lived player.
1.1 Modeling Approach and Related Literature
With the inclusion of two utility-maximizing money suppliers, the differential nature of the play-
ers in the centralized market becomes important. The (0, 1) continuum of economic agents trade
competitively, anonymously, and their individual actions are unobservable. Only their aggregate
play is important and consequential. On the other hand, the two money suppliers’ individual
actions are observable and affect the aggregate centralized market outcome. Games with such a
composition of players are called games between multiple large or long-lived players and a small
or a short-lived player comprised of a continuum of long-lived players (Fudenberg et al. (1990)
and Mailath & Samuelson (2006)). Following this literature, we model the money suppliers as a
long-lived players and the (0, 1) continuum of agents as a short-lived player (alternatively called
a short-run player). The reference to size or longevity of the player is based on his or her ability to
influence aggregate outcomes, anonymity, and observability of individual actions.
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As an important implication of unobservability and informational irrelevance of agent’s indi-
vidual actions, there cannot be any belief based dynamics in this model. This is especially impor-
tant given the exchange rate indeterminacy in this model as argued in Kareken & Wallace (1981) 1.
It could be argued that this indeterminacy could make predicting exchange rate difficult increas-
ing uncertainty for the agents. As a result of such uncertainty, agents’ beliefs about the exchange
rates could influence the behavior of the money suppliers altering the equilibrium dynamics. Such
dynamics, however is not plausible in the set up of this paper. This is because modeling agents as
a continuum on an unit interval ensures that any idiosyncratic uncertainty does not survive ag-
gregation and therefore does not play any role in shaping aggregate outcomes. This result follows
from the seminal paper by Robert Aumann (Aumann (1964)) and subsequent literature.
There are several strands of literature that are directly or indirectly related to this paper. One
such strand is the dual currency literature that deals with emergence of an iternational currency
and coexistence of it with other currencies, Examples include but are not limited to Curtis & Waller
(2000), Trejos & Wright (2001), Head & Shi (2003), Camera et al. (2003), Craig & Waller (2004), Lotz
(2004), Martin (2006), and Zhang (2014). Models with dual currencies based on the LW framework
have also been used to model use of multiple assets as means of payments or collateral. Some of
the examples from this literature are Lagos & Rocheteau (2008), Lester et al. (2012), Lagos (2010,
2011), and Geromichalos et al. (2007), and Geromichalos & Simonovska (2014)2. However, in
many of these models, there is some ex-ante difference in the available assets- they are not perfect
substitutes. Since, the two currencies in this paper are perfect substitutes to start with, the results
here could throw some light on possible equilibrium outcomes when two or more assets with
similar profile compete as means of payments.
Because of absence of government in this paper and that the monies are useless pieces of paper
issued by two private competing money suppliers, it is closely related to the idea and literature
on Free Banking3. According to Selgin (n.d.) free banking primarily refers to banking without
1Market with two currencies here represents dual currency payment systems. The exchange rate in such set up is
indeterminate as there are not enough equations to determine the value of both the currencies. See (Nosal & Rocheteau,
2017, pp. 307-08)
2Lagos et al. (2015) provides a comprehensive summary of this literature.
3 A detailed analysis of the Free Banking idea and a thematic presentation can be found in Selgin & White (1994)
and a summary argument in Selgin (2008)
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government deposit insurance or a lender of last resort and free of legal restrictions on interest
rates, bank portfolios, branch banking, and, most interestingly, private and competitive note (cur-
rency) issuance. Based on Bertrand competition, efficiency of a competitive market in currency
was argued by Hayek ((Hayek (1976), Hayek (1978)). Following this, the free banking literature
elaborates more on the desirability of monopoly in currency issue given the strong case against it
in other areas of economic analysis.
For example, Klein (1974) studies efficiency of competing private monies and is part of the
Free banking literature according to Selgin & White (1994). She builds a monopolistic competution
model of money where different private monies have different characteristics giving them a brand
value. In such a setup intentionally depreciating the exchange value of money is not consistent
with profit maximization for the money issuer and hence the equilibrium is not characterized by
over issue. Unlike this paper, Kelin’s model is micro-founded only from money suppliers point
of view. The demand for money is assumed to be exogenously given or what is now termed as
included in reduced form. 4.
Answering whether monopoly private money supply is feasible, Berentsen (2006) finds that
the revenue-maximizing policy is time-consistent if the trading history of the issuer is public
information and if money demanders respond to the revelation of defection by playing barter.
Li (2009), Williamson (1999), and Sun (2007) are examples of models where private competitive
money supply improves welfare. On the other hand Marimon et al. (2012) and Sanches (2016)
show that private competitive money supply reduces welfare relative to a monopoly supply of
fiat money. Another recent paper in this literature, Fernández-Villaverde & Sanches (2016), is the
closest to this paper in terms of research question and the modeling framework. In the Lagos-
Wright environment, they include multiple utility maximizing entrepreneurs who can issue their
own fiat currencies. Their main result is similar to this paper in that there exists an equilibrium
in which price stability is consistent with competing private monies, but also that there exists a
continuum of equilibrium trajectories with the property that value of private currencies monoton-
4The competing notes issued by the New England colonies, the notes issued by various branches of the Second Bank
of the United States, and the free banking era of the antebellum United States are some of the examples when monies
issued by several independent or interdependent entities circulated at par or at discount with each other (Klein, 1974,
p.439-440).
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ically converges to zero.
In comparison to these papers, the novelty of this paper is its game theoretic approach and
the use of an equilibrium refinement to narrow the set of equilibria in an economy with only
competing fiat monies. It does not require some form of government intervention as in Sanches
(2016) or an introduction of a competing asset like capital in Fernández-Villaverde & Sanches
(2016) to narrow the set of equilibria. The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section two
outlines the dual currency model. Section three analyzes monetary policy under no commitment
but where the money suppliers are concerned about reputation. Section four provides concluding
comments.
2 The Model
The model is a variant of Lagos & Wright (2005) with two fiat monies. Goods and money are
perfectly divisible. There are two sub-periods, a day sub-period where special goods are traded
in a decentralized market and a night sub-period where a general good is traded in a central-
ized Walrasian market. The decentralized market is characterized by trading frictions and hence
money gets valued for the liquidity services it provides. The night trading, though centralized, is
anonymous and is used by agents to trade in the general good and rebalance their portfolios. The
economy is characterized by imperfect memory and record keeping to rule out credit transactions
as stressed in Kocherlakota (1998) and Wallace (2001).
2.1 Behavior of Agents
To describe the equilibrium we begin by describing the value functions, taking as given the terms
of trade and distribution of monies. The state variables for the individual include his real money
balances and a vector of aggregate states s. Let s = (piR,piB), where piR and piB are the growth
rates of currency R and B respectively. Let Φ = (φR, φB), where φR and φB is the value of money
in currency R and B respectively, in the centralized market. It represents the units of general good
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that be bought by one unit of the respective currency in the centralized market. 5
Consider an agent who holds R and B units of currency at the beginning of the first sub-period.
Then, his real portfolio is given by m = [r b] = [φRR φBB]. Before entering the decentralized
market in the first sub-period the agent decides how much of this money to carry along as a
means of payment. He or she carries both the monies to the market and can pay with either of
them or both.
Let the probability of a meeting be ω , that of single coincidence meeting be τ, and that of
barter exchange be θ. In a single coincidence meeting a seller’s production L must equal the
buyer’s consumption x. Let us denote the common value as q(m, m˜, s) and money that changed
hands as d(m, m˜, s), where m and m˜ are buyer’s and seller’s real money balances. E(m, m˜, s) is the
payoff in a double coincidence meeting.
Let V(m, s) be the value function for an agent entering the decentralized market with m port-
folio and W(m, s) be the value function for the centralized market. V(m, s) is given by
V(m, s) = ωτ
∫
{u[q(m, m˜, s)] +W[m− d(m, m˜, s)]} dZ(m˜) (1)
+ωτ
∫
{−c[q(m˜, m, s)] +W[m + d(m˜, m, s)]} dZ(m˜)
+ωθ
∫
E(m, m˜, s) dZ(m˜) + (1− 2ωτ −ωθ)W(m, s)
where Z(·) is the distribution of currency portfolios. Let w be the vector of choice variables (ri, bi)
in the centralized market and L be the number of labor hours worked. The value of entering the
centralized market with portfolio m is
W(m, s) = max{U(X)− TL + βV(m+1, s+1)} (2)
s.t. X = L + m−w (3)
5The material in this section follows Lagos & Rocheteau (2008) who add capital to the model in Lagos & Wright
(2005) to address the coexistence of capital and money in a monetary economy. In this paper, capital is substituted with
a second currency to create a dual currency version of the model.
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Substituting (3) in (2) and normalizing T = 1 , we get:
W(m, s) = m +max
X,w
{U(X)− X−w + βV(m+1, s+1)} (4)
We can see clearly that U′(X) = 1 implying that X = X∗. Secondly, the choice of w is in-
dependent of m. All that agents care about is the real value of their portfolio and not how it is
constituted. Thirdly, W is linear in a and W(m + d, s)−W(m, s) = d. The payoff in the double
coincidence meeting is E(m, m˜, s) = u(q∗)− c(q∗) +W(m, s), where no money changes hands.
2.2 Behavior of Money Suppliers
There are two monetary authorities, BankR and BankB issuing R and B currency respectively. New
money is issued by the money suppliers in the centralized market to consume the general good-
a privilege derived from access to record keeping technology (Fernández-Villaverde & Sanches,
2016, pp.12).
The money suppliers choose money growth rates to maximize the utility from consumption.
For simplicity, the utility function is assumed to be linear in consumption. As the money sup-
pliers’ are long run players, utility maximization amounts to choosing the money growth rate to
maximize the average discounted payoff:
(1− δ)
∞
∑
t=0
δtµR(Rt−1,piRt ,piBt ) (5)
(1− δ)
∞
∑
t=0
δtµB(Bt−1,piRt ,piBt ) (6)
Under no commitment, the money suppliers do not have access to any commitment device
and therefore take their decisions period by period 6. Neither of the currencies is redeemable
for any good or service- both are pure fiat monies with no intrinsic value. Unlike Martin (2011,
2013), there is no debt in this environment and the money suppliers consume the general good
6It is however assumed that within period commitment is possible for the money suppliers. I thank one of the
anonymous referees for pointing it out.
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and do not return it to the economy as a public good. Hence, for a given increase in monetary
growth rate, the interplay between the rise in current demand for money and a higher required
rate of return on debt in future as a mechanism determining a time consistent debt level today
is not available in this model. The behavior of money suppliers here could be understood as a
simplified representation of use of seignorage to finance government consumption of goods and
services akin to the nature of government spending in many developing countries.
Being a duopoly supply of money, a change in the growth rate of one currency affects the value
of both currencies through the resulting change in the total stock of money as well as relative
proportion of currencies. As there is no difference between these two currencies in terms of the
payment services they provide, there is a total symmetry between them. We can also think of
them as two currencies but one unit of account7. The quasi-linearity of utility function for the
centralized market implies that all the agents will carry a portfolio with same real value and not
necessarily with same currency composition out of the centralized market.
3 Centralized market game under no commitment
We model the choice of monetary growth rate under no commitment as an infinitely repeated
game.Fudenberg et al. (1990) provide an analysis of games between a short lived player (a con-
tinuum of long lived players) and one long lived player. Because the short lived player optimizes
myopically i.e., is concerned only with optimizing current period consumption and the money
that it carries out of the centralized market—it always plays Nash response and hence the equilib-
rium outcomes lie on its best response function. Fudenberg & Levine (1994) extend this analysis
to the case of a general game of imperfect public monitoring with more than one long lived play-
ers and a short lived player. We consider a game of perfect monitoring, which is a special case
of imperfect monitoring as described below. Mailath & Samuelson (2006) serves as a one point
reference for this and related literature on repeated games and reputation8. This section uses the
modeling apparatus and terminology provided by them.
7I thank one of the anonymous referees for pointing this out.
8Sannikov (2007) and Faingold & Sannikov (2011) offer a continuous time perspective on such games and others
involving reputation.
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3.1 Centralized Market Game of Perfect Monitoring
After every decentralized trading period, the centralized market opens with two long-run players—
the money suppliers, BankB and BankR, and a (0, 1) continuum of economic agents (a short-run
player). To maximize consumption of the generic good X in the stage game, the money suppliers
and the agents choose the monetary growth rate and work hours respectively .
Following is the description of centralized market stage (one-shot) game:
Players: Two money suppliers (long-run players) and (0, 1) continuum of anonymous agents
(short-run player).
Actions: money suppliers choose monetary growth rate, pii ∈ (Ai) = [pimini ,pimaxi ) and the agents
choose L ∈ [Lmin, Lmax) to maximize utility in the centralized market. The action set is either
finite or a convex subset of the Euclidean subspace <k for some k. Y = A and ρ(y|a) = 1 if
y = a and 0 otherwise.
Payoffs: Agents: W(L,piR,piB) = U[(L∗− (1− δ)∑∞t=0 δtµR(Rt−1,piRt ,piBt ))− (1− δ)∑∞t=0 δtµB(Bt−1,piRt ,piBt )))−
L∗] + βVt+1
Payoffs: money suppliers: (1− δ)∑∞t=0 δtµR(Rt−1,piRt ,piBt )) and (1− δ)∑∞t=0 δtµB(Bt−1,piRt ,piBt ))
Preferences: Preferences are given by the payoff functions. They are decreasing in L and pi for
the agents and increasing in own monetary growth rate but decreasing in the other bank’s
monetary growth rate for the money suppliers.
As in the LW framework, the hold-up problem caused by any increase in rate of monetary
growth rate causes a decrease in q. Any such decrease in the quantity traded in the decentral-
ized market along with the increase in work hours for the agents in the centralized market can
be interpreted as an inflation tax imposed by the money suppliers’ consumption. To maintain the
quasi-linearity of the environment however, we assume that the upper bound on the agents’ labor
supply does not bind. This constrains the maximum inflation tax to some e ∈ (0, 1) neighbor-
hood of Lmax. The choice sets for both money suppliers and the agents, therefore, are shown right
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open in the game description above. If this were not the case, then wealth effects become op-
erational: individual real balances become dependent on past trading histories, value functions
become strictly concave in money holdings, and the distribution of money holdings ends up non-
degenerate (Rocheteau et al. (2015)) 9.
After the bilateral trading in the decentralized market, agents enter the centralized market
to rebalance their portfolios before going to the next decentralized market. They discount the
future at the rate of β. The payoff for the agents is the value function they face for participating
in the centralized Walrasian market. It captures the incentives faced by the agents in this market.
Their level of consumption and the money balances they carry out to help their trade in the next
decentralized market period depends on their willingness to work, consumption choices of money
suppliers, and the money they carried to the centralized market. As noted earlier, quasilinear
preferences ensure that each agent carries a portfolio with same value and not necessarily of same
currency composition when he or she exits the Walrasian market.
The money suppliers compete with each other as well as with the agents for consumption of
the generic good X, putting an upward pressure on its price and a downward pressure on the
value of both the currencies. This has consequences not only for the work effort and consump-
tion of agents in the centralized market but also for the consumption in decentralized market.
Because the agents discount future at the rate of β, they prefer having more money for use in the
decentralized market to ensure the required quantity of the specialized good in a single coinci-
dence meeting. Therefore, when the money suppliers decide to increase their consumption of X
by printing more money, agents best response is to adjust the work hours to minimize the impact
of increased money supply on the value of the two monies. The later happens because the rate of
return on either monies is lower than the discount rate for a positive money growth rate implying
a positive liquidity premium (Nosal & Rocheteau, 2011, pp. 68).
This centralized market stage or one shot game has a unique Nash equilibrium. The following
proposition states it formally:
Proposition 3.1. Equilibrium-Stage game under no commitment: Assuming that any single agent
9I thank one of the anonymous referees for pointing this out and providing the reference.
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believes that monies from the centralized market will be accepted by other agents in the decentralized market,
the one-shot game between the two banks is a Prisoner’s Dilemma and (eLmax, epiRmax, epiBmax) for all 0 <
e < 1 is the only Nash equilibrium of the stage game.
Proof. Because of being a short lived player, the agents myopically optimize by playing their best
response for the one-shot game. Therefore, any equilibrium is constrained to be on the short lived
players’ best response set. Because the agents always play their best responses, we only have to
see if the money suppliers have any incentive for a unilateral deviation. As each of the banks has
a strong incentive to deviate from the minimum required monetary growth rate, assuming that
the other bank will stay put, the game becomes a prisoner’s dilemma. Accordingly, even though
there is a better equilibrium, (eLmax, epiRmax, epiBmax) for all 0 < e < 1, is the only Nash equilibrium
of the one-shot game 10.
3.2 Infinite Repetition of the Centralized Market Game
What happens if this one-shot game is repeated infinitely? In the general case of infinitely repeated
games, there are multiple equilibria associated with different degrees of patience. This follows
from the folk theorem for infinitely repeated games, which, however cannot be applied to the
game being considered here. This is because the presence of short-lived players means that some
of the extreme points of the equilibrium payoff set can be produced only by mixtures and hence
do not have corresponding pure strategy representation. Fudenberg et al. (1990) characterize the
equilibrium pay off set and present a folk theorem for the case of a single long lived player and
one or more short lived players and Fudenberg & Levine (1994) do so for more than multiple
long lived players. We use the apparatus provided by them and Mailath & Samuelson (2006) to
characterize the equilibrium payoff set for the centralized market game in this paper.
Another technical issue relates to the number of short lived players in a game. Equilibrium
behavior with a large but finite number of short lived players might be very different under per-
10As mentioned before, maintaining quasi-linearity of the environment requires that the feasibility constraint on the
labor supply does not bind. Hence, the Nash equilibrium is stated as one in the epsilon neighborhood of the upper
bound. As under utility theory, a positive affine transformation of payoffs preserves the game structure, we can think
of this equilibrium as that of an e-scaled down version of centralized market game where 0 < e < 1.
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Variable Description
pimin Minimum Money Growth rate
pimax Maximum Money Growth Rate
φh Highest Value of a currency
φl Lowest Value of a currency
e parameter ∈ (0, 1)
L Hours worked-Centralized Market
fect monitoring than with short lived anonymous players (a continuum) (Mailath & Samuelson,
2006, p.269). Under imperfect monitoring this discontinuity disappears and therefore we use the
imperfect monitoring setup to characterize the equilibrium pay off set and then use the perfect
monitoring characterization of the folk theorem below. This works because under perfect moni-
toring, all action profiles of all long lived players have full rank- a sufficient condition to enable
Nash threats. Also, because intertemporal incentives need to be provided only for the long lived
players, it is sufficient that their actions are perfectly monitored (Mailath & Samuelson, 2006, pp.
305).
We state the proposition giving the lower and upper bound of the equilibrium payoff set here
and proof in the appendix along with perfect monitoring characterization of the game in this
paper.
Proposition 3.2. Equilibrium Payoff Set: Minmax and least favorable payoffs for money supplier B are
given by g
B
= piminB φ
h
BBt−1 and g¯B = epi
max
B φ
l
BBt−1, ∀e ∈ (0, 1). Similarly, Minmax and least favorable
payoffs for the central bank R are given by g
R
= piminR φ
h
RRt−1 and g¯R = epi
max
R φ
l
RRt−1, ∀e ∈ (0, 1).
Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium payoff set and the relationship of labor supply, money growth
rate and seignorage for a money supplier in this economy. This diagram is drawn for a given
supply of the competing money supplier. As argued before, as an implication of increased money
supply by either of the money supplier, agents need to work more to compensate for the impact
of resulting decline in value of money on their consumption of the generic good. You can see this
from the first panel on the left side in the figure and subsequent effect on value of money and
seignorage revenue from the remaining two panels. The incentives for agents are clear from their
payoff function above.
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Figure 1: Relationship of labor supply, money growth rate, and seignorage under currency com-
petition
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Given the above equilibrium payoff set, the following proposition describes which of these
payoffs can be supported as an equilibrium. In the spirit of folk theorems for repeated games, it
basically highlights the fact that there are multiple equilibria in this infinitely repeated centralized
market game.
Proposition 3.3. Long lived–Short-lived player theorem for the Two Money Suppliers LW Econ-
omy: Suppose there are two money suppliers (long-lived players) along with a continuum of agents (a
short-lived player). With the equilibrium payoff set as defined in Proposition 3.2, for every g ∈ intF∗, sat-
isfying gi < g¯i for i = (BankB, BankR), there exists a δ such that for all δ ∈ (δ, 1), there exists a subgame
perfect equilibrium of the repeated game with perfect monitoring with value g.
Proof. It is a straight forward application of proposition 9.3.2 from (Mailath & Samuelson, 2006,
pp.305) for multiple long-lived players and a short lived player as stated below:
Suppose A is finite and F† has nonempty interior. For every v ∈ intF∗ satisfying vi < v¯i for i = 1..., n,
there exists a δ such that for all δ ∈ (δ, 1), there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium of the repeated game
with perfect monitoring with value v.
Thus, there are multiple equilibria in the two money suppliers model. Any of those, could be
sustained depending on the money suppliers’ level of patience. The payoffs depend on the history
of money suppliers’ actions and only the aggregate play of the agents. Given that agents always
play Nash strategies, their incentive constraints are always satisfied. So to ensure that appropri-
ate incentives exist for the money suppliers to stay on a given money growth rate, only specify-
ing Nash reversion for the short lived players after observing a deviation is enough (Mailath &
Samuelson, 2006, p. 93). Here Nash reversion would imply reverting to lower level of L and hence
increase in price of X and decrease in value of money.
The threat of barter is credible because the agents are allowed to skip the centralized market
if they anticipate a deviation from the range of money growth rates corresponding to the equilib-
rium payoff set in Proposition 3.2. At higher money growth rates, the value of money declines
faster because of increase in total money supply as well as supply of one currency relative to an-
other making more agents indifferent between having any kind of money and not having it. This
13
increases the probability that a greater number agents skip the centralized market explaining the
flattening of the seignorage curve. Thus, the money suppliers will have to choose their money
growth rate from a finite interval determined by agents’ willingness to work more. This gives the
following proposition:
Proposition 3.4. Incentive Feasibility of payoffs: The monetary growth rates corresponding to the
equilibrium payoff set are the only ones that are incentive feasible in case of both the money suppliers.
Proof. To be incentive feasible, the allocations should satisfy participation constraints and should
be incentive compatible. Money being essential in this environment because of imperfect memory
and lack of commitment, agents are better off using it than not. Similarly, the money suppliers
would enjoy positive utility supplying money than not. This suggests that the participation con-
straints for both the players are satisfied. Considering the incentive constraints, because the equi-
librium payoff set maps money suppliers’ strategies to choose consumption to the Nash responses
of the agents, it corresponds to the best response function B. Hence it satisfies the incentive con-
straints for both the players.
3.2.1 Equilibrium Selection for the Infinitely Repeated Game
To explore the possibility of narrowing down of the equilibrium set, we need some refinement
mechanism. In what follows, we use renegotiation-proofness of an equilibrium as an equilibrium
refinement and show that the low inflation tax equilibrium (Lmin,piRmin,pi
B
min) is weakly renegotia-
tion proof.
A subgame perfect equilibrium σ is weakly renegotiation proof (WRP) if there do not exist
continuation equilibria σ1, σ2 of σ such that σ1 strictly pareto dominates σ2. If an equilibrium σ is
WRP, then the associated payoffs are also WRP (Farrell & Maskin (1989)).
In simple words, renegotiation-proofness implies that players at the beginning of the game or
at any point in the game are able to coordinate on an efficient equilibrium. In all the range of
equilibriums leading to the payoffs from the equilibrium payoff set, only the one with minimum
inflation tax Pareto dominates all other equilibriums. The following proposition states it formally.
14
Proposition 3.5. Equilibrium Selection for Infinitely Repeated Game of Two competitive money suppliers
in an LW Economy: Even though there are multiple equilibria following Proposition 3.3, the only equi-
librium that is weakly renegotiation proof, (Lmin,piRmin,pi
B
min), features lowest inflation tax (cooperative
outcome).
Proof. Farrell & Maskin (1989) and van Damme (1989) show that cooperation in a infinitely re-
peated prisoners dilemma is weakly renogtiation-proof outcome if the discount factor is suffi-
ciently close to 1. Given that the one-shot game here is a prisoner’s dilemma (following Propo-
sition 3.1), the cooperative equilibrium, (Lmin,piRmin,pi
B
min), becomes WRP if the both the money
suppliers are near perfectly patient. If this is the case, then (Lmin,piRmin,pi
B
min) will be the equilib-
rium most likely to be played in the infinite repetition.
From the point of view of efficient currency provision under competitive markets this is an
important result. It suggests that the issue of time inconsistency arising because of lack of full
commitment may be resolved provided both the money suppliers are perfectly patient and are
able to renegotiate their behavior at any point in the game. However, note that because the money
suppliers are utility-maximizing agents, even the cooperative equilibrium features a positive in-
flation tax.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a dual currency version of Lagos & Wright (2005) money search model
to explore the nature of optimal monetary policy under competitive supply of money. One of
the fundamental and often debated questions in monetary theory is whether competitive money
supply is more efficient than a monopoly. It also seems to be of practical importance, given the
emergence of multiple cryptocurrencies as well as multiple financial assets as a means of payment
in certain class of transactions. To address the question, we analyze the nature of optimal mone-
tary policy under currency competition and no commitment in a micro funded model of money.
In the centralized market game modeled as a dynamic game between two utility maximizing pri-
vate money suppliers and a continuum of agents, the Nash equilibrium of the stage game features
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highest inflation tax similar to the single money supplier case in Waknis (2014).
There are multiple equilibria in the infinite repetition of this game and any of those could be
supported as an equilibrium in infinite repetition as the agents are free to skip the centralized
market. This determines the monetary growth rates that could be supported as incentive feasible
equilibrium payoff set. Any growth rate outside of this set triggers barter as agents tend towards
indifference between having money and not having it and skip the centralized market.
It is possible to narrow down the possibilities further using an equilibrium refinement mech-
anism. The competition between money suppliers and the fact that agents play only Nash re-
sponses transforms the centralized market game to a prisoners dilemma between the two money
suppliers, allowing us to use the idea of renegotiation proof equilibria as a refinement mecha-
nism. Accordingly, the refinement suggests that if both the money suppliers are patient enough,
then the equilibrium with lowest inflation tax (cooperative equilibrium) is weakly renegotiation
proof, implying that currency competition is likely to generate a low inflationary outcome.
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A Perfect Monitoring Characterization of Games of Imperfect Public
Monitoring
In a game with imperfect public monitoring, players 1, . . . , n are long-lived players and players
n + 1, . . . , N are short-lived players with player i having a set of pure actions Ai, which is a com-
pact subspace of the Euclidian <k for some k. Players choose actions simultaneously.
B : ∏ni=14(Ai)⇒ ∏Ni=n+14(Ai) is the mapping of any mixed action profile for the long-lived
players to the corresponding set of static Nash equilibria for the short-lived players.
At the end of the one-shot game players observe a public signal y, drawn from a signal space
Y. ρ(y|a) is the probability that the signal y is realized, given the action profile a ∈ A = ∏i Ai.
Player i’s payoff after realization (y, a) is given by u∗i (y, a).
The set of public histories isH ≡ ⋃∞i=0 Yt.
The set of histories for player i isHi ≡ ⋃∞i=0(Ai ×Y)t.
We assume that each short-run player in period t observes only the public history.
A pure strategy for player i is a mapping from all possible histories into the set of pure actions,
σi :Hi → Ai and a mixed strategy is a mapping σi :Hi → 4(Ai).
A behavior strategy σi is public if, in every period t, it depends only on the public history
ht ∈ Yt and not on i’s private history. A perfect public equilibrium (PPE) is a profile of public
strategies σ that for any public history ht specifies a Nash equilibrium for the repeated game, i.e.
for all t and all ht ∈ Yt, σ|ht is a Nash equilibrium. A PPE is strict if each player strictly prefers his
equilibrium strategy to every other public strategy. The set of PPE payoff vectors of the long-run
players is denoted by E(δ) ⊂ <n.
Given these definitions, we can describe a game of perfect monitoring as a special case where
Y = A and ρ(y|a) = 1 if y = a and 0 otherwise. Accordingly, the game between the two money
suppliers (long-lived players) and a continuum of economic agents (a short-lived player) in the
second sub-period is a game of perfect monitoring. This is because the set of actions for the money
suppliers is observable along with the aggregate play of the agents, Y = A and there is no noise
in the suppliers’ actions being conveyed as ρ(y|a) = 1 if y = a and 0.
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B Proof of Proposition 3.2
Let the equilibrium set of strictly individually rational payoffs be F †. This set is contained in the
set of payoffs that is generated by all the pure actions F . To guarantee enforceability of α even
when it is not an equilibrium, we need that the signals generated by any action αi be statistically
distinguishable from those of any other mixture α′i. This is ensured if the profile α has a full rank.
In the game under consideration, there are two long-lived players and the infinitely lived agents
are the short-lived players. In such games, if A is finite and there is perfect monitoring (Y = A
and ρ(a′|a) = 1 if a′ = a and 0 otherwise), then all action profiles have pairwise full rank for all
pairs of long-lived players (money suppliers). This implies that
⋂
λ∈Λn H∗(λ) = F †.
Given a direction λ ∈ <n, and constant k ∈ <, H(λ, k) denotes the half space such that g ∈
<n : λ.g ≤ k. Let B(W ; δ, α) be the set of payoffs that can be decomposed by α on Q, when the
discount factor is δ. Then, for a fixed λ and α, define:
k∗(α,λ, δ) = max
v
λ.g (7)
subject to g ∈ B(H(λ,λ.v); δ, α).
It can be shown that k∗(α,λ, δ) is independent of δ and so can be written as k∗(α,λ). How-
ever, k∗(α,λ) ≤ λ.u(α) with the equality holding only if α is orthogonally enforced in the di-
rection λ. Thus, the equilibrium payoff set can be approximated H(λ, k∗(α,λ)), only if α is cho-
sen appropriately. A way out is to choose an action profile that maximizes k∗(α,λ), that is set
k∗(λ) ≡ supα∈B k∗(α,λ) and H∗(λ) ≡ H(λ, k∗(λ)). This is referred to as the maximal half space in
the direction λ. It is the largest H(λ, k) half space with the property that a boundary point of the
half space can be decomposed with respect to that half space (Mailath & Samuelson, 2006, p. 293).
The coordinate direction λ = ej and therefore, k∗(ej), defines the least favorable payoff (v¯j) for
a long-lived player and as mentioned above k∗(−ej) gives the minmax payoff (vj). Thus, these
two give the stretch of the maximal half space and given that the equilibrium payoff F † can be
approximated by the intersection of the maximal half space, k∗(−ej) and k∗(ej) form the limit
points or bounds of this equilibrium payoff set.
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In the case of the model in this paper, the long-lived players are the money suppliers. Given
the definitions of vj and v¯j in , to prove proposition (??), we have to prove that for BankB
k∗(−ej) = −min
α∈B
max
aj
uj(aj, α−j) = piminB φ
h
BBt−1 (8)
k∗(ej) = max
α∈B
min
aj∈Supp(αi)
uj(aj, α−j) = pimaxB φ
l
BBt−1 (9)
An analogous proof will hold for BankR.
Proof. The first part of equation 2 above states the coordinate direction λ = −ej corresponds
to minimizing long-lived player j’s payoff because −ej.g = −gj. Given that piminB φhBBt−1 is the
maximum payoff BankB can hope to achieve if agents only put in minimal work, it becomes the
minmax payoff.
The first part of the equation 3 suggests that the maximum payoff either long-lived player
could attain cannot be greater than k∗(ej). Alternatively, the payoff from best response to a strat-
egy, α−j played by all other players cannot give a payoff better than the upper bound. The payoff
pimaxB φ
l
BBt−1 is the maximum payoff that BankB could hope to reach if the agents play any other
strategy than "do minimal additional work". In fact to maintain quasilinearity of preferences in
the centralized market, neither of the money suppliers would be able to exactly achieve it. They
can only hope to get epimaxB φ
l
BBt−1 for all e ∈ (0, 1).
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